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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1854 
____________ 
 
EARL ROWAN; SIMON TAYLOR, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF BAYONNE, a municipal corporation; 
WILLIAM O’BRIEN; JOANNE CORBETT 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-07-cv-04237) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 20, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 10, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Earl Rowan and Simon Taylor (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from orders of 
the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Bayonne, William 
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O’Brien, and Joanne Corbett (collectively, “Appellees”).  For the reasons set forth below, 
we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Appellants both worked for the City of Bayonne, New Jersey (“City”).  Rowan 
worked for the Bayonne Parking Authority until 2004, at which time he was assigned to 
work at the Bayonne Public Library (“Library”).  Taylor was hired as a full-time 
employee in 2000, and shortly thereafter transferred to the Library.  Corbett served as 
Appellants’ supervisor.  In August 2005, O’Brien, a supervisor for the Department of 
Public Works (“DPW”), used a racial slur to refer to Appellants.  As a result of this 
incident, O’Brien was initially terminated by the City, but his termination was later 
reduced to a sixty-day suspension.  On September 25, 2005, Appellants filed complaints 
against the City and O’Brien with the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  In May 2006, Appellants and the City 
reached a settlement on these claims, pursuant to which Appellants agreed to release all 
claims related to the August 2005 incident, and the City agreed to conduct sensitivity 
training within sixty days. 
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In June 2006, Rowan requested a schedule change due to family problems, and on 
September 8, 2006, he was transferred to a position at DPW, which required him to work 
on a garbage truck.  Rowan expressed concern that a medical condition made it difficult 
for him to work on the garbage truck, and on August 1, 2007, DPW reassigned him to a 
street sweeping position. 
 In July 2007, Appellants filed a second complaint with the EEOC, alleging that 
they were discriminated against on the basis of race and that they faced retaliation as a 
result of their filing the initial EEOC complaint.  On September 5, 2007, Appellants filed 
a nine-count complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against 
the City and O’Brien, alleging First Amendment retaliation (Count One), Title VII 
violations (Count Eight), violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(“LAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq. (Counts Two and Three), violations of the New 
Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-1, et 
seq. (Count Seven), as well as common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (Count Four), negligent hiring and retention (Count Five), and breach of contract 
(Count Nine).  The District Court subsequently granted, in part, Rowan’s motion to 
amend his complaint to add Corbett as a defendant, and denied Taylor’s motion to amend 
the complaint. 
 On June 30, 2010, Appellees moved for summary judgment as to all counts.  On 
March 23, 2011, the District Court granted Appellees’ motions as to several counts, and 
  
4 
on March 31, 2011, the District Court issued a memorandum opinion and order, 
dismissing all remaining claims.
1
  Appellants filed timely notices of appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo, and apply “the same standard that guides our district 
courts.”  Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted).  Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
III. 
Appellants first contend that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on their First Amendment retaliation claim (Count One).  We 
                                              
1
 Appellants contend that the District Judge was required to recuse himself based 
on his relationship with the City’s mayor.  We disagree.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a 
District Judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned [or] [w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party.”  We emphasize that “when the court has invested substantial judicial resources 
and there is indisputably no evidence of prejudice, a motion for recusal should be 
supported by substantial justification, not fanciful illusion.”  Martin v. Monumental Life 
Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 237 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  Here, we can find no 
evidence of bias or prejudice and therefore we reject Appellants’ argument.  See 
McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678-79 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s argument that recusal was required under similar circumstances). 
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disagree.
2
  Rowan alleges that he was retaliated against by being twice “demoted” and 
Taylor alleges that he was denied overtime pay.  To establish a claim for First 
Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must show:  “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, 
(2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising 
h[er] constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally protected 
conduct and the retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 
(3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  The threshold inquiry is whether the speech in question 
is protected by the First Amendment, i.e., whether it relates to “a matter of public 
concern.”  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).  Here, Appellants cite three 
instances in which they engaged in protected conduct:  (1) their filing of an EEOC 
complaint in September 2005; (2) their filing of a second EEOC complaint in August 
2007; and (3) Rowan’s letter to the City’s mayor alleging that Corbett attempted to 
coerce another employee into filing a sexual harassment suit against Rowan.  We agree 
with the District Court that Appellants’ statements focused on personal grievances and 
did not relate to any “public concern.”  See Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 
829 (3d Cir. 1994).  Appellants did not seek to expose discriminatory or harassing 
                                              
2
 Because the same analytical framework governs retaliation claims under CEPA, 
we conclude that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Appellants’ state 
law retaliation claims was also proper.  See Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New 
Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 802 (3d Cir. 2010); Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 
1013 (N.J. 1998) (citations omitted) (explaining that, under CEPA, “the offensive activity 
must pose a threat of public harm, not merely private harm or harm only to the aggrieved 
employee”). 
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practices by the City; rather, they complained only about isolated acts directed solely at 
them.  Thus, Appellants have not shown that they engaged in any protected speech. 
Rowan also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his Title VII claims 
(Count Eight).  We note as a threshold matter that after a plaintiff files an EEOC 
complaint, any subsequent Title VII claims are limited to those contained in his EEOC 
complaint.  See Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1978).  Here, 
Rowan’s EEOC complaint addressed only the City’s failure to promote him and 
retaliation based on his engaging in protected speech.  Thus, the District Court properly 
disregarded Rowan’s hostile work environment allegations.  To establish retaliation in 
violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must show that:  (1) he engaged in a protected activity; 
(2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between 
the adverse employment action and the protected activity.  Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 
110 F.3d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1997).  Here, the District Court properly concluded that 
Rowan failed to establish a causal connection between his filing of the EEOC complaints 
and the actions that he alleges were retaliatory.  The record indicates that the City 
transferred Rowan in response to his own requests; he has presented no evidence beyond 
his own allegations to show that the City “demoted” him in retaliation for his engaging in 
a protected activity.  As to Rowan’s failure to promote claim, under Title VII, he was 
required to file his EEOC complaint within 300 days of the latest date on which the City 
allegedly failed to promote him.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
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Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-14 (2002).  However, he has failed to identify any 
instances in which he requested, and was denied, a promotion within 300 days of the 
filing of his second EEOC complaint.  Thus, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees on Rowan’s Title VII failure to promote claim. 
Finally, Appellants contend that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees on Appellants’ state law claims.  Again, we disagree.3  
First, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on Taylor’s claims under the 
LAD (Counts Two and Three) because such claims were barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations.  Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 655 (N.J. 1993).  Under the LAD, where 
a plaintiff alleges a pattern or series of discriminatory acts, the cause of action “accrue[s] 
on the date on which the last act occurred, notwithstanding that some of the component 
acts . . . [fell] outside the statutory time period.”  Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental 
Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 623 (N.J. 2002) (internal marks and citation omitted).  In this case, 
the last act of alleged harassment occurred no later than August 2005.  The original 
complaint was filed on September 5, 2007, and thus, Taylor’s LAD claims are time-
barred. 
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 The District Court properly granted the Appellees’ motions for summary 
judgment on Appellants’ respondeat superior claim (Count Six) on the basis that the 
doctrine of respondeat superior does not provide an independent cause of action under 
New Jersey law.  See Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460, 463 (N.J. 2003).  Additionally, 
Appellants have not challenged the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on their 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count Four). 
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Second, the District Court properly disposed of Appellants’ negligent hiring and 
retention claim (Count Five) on the basis that it failed to comply with the pleading 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.  The allegations in Appellants’ 
complaint regarding negligent hiring and retention are conclusory and do not set forth 
how the City’s decision to reinstate O’Brien resulted in harm.  See Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 
A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1982) (stating that the tort of negligent hiring requires the plaintiff to 
show that the employer’s negligence in hiring the employee caused injury).  The District 
Court properly concluded that such allegations were inadequate to state a plausible claim 
for relief.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
Finally, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on 
Appellants’ breach of contract claim (Count Nine).  Appellants alleged that the City 
breached the May 2006 settlement agreement by reinstating O’Brien, failing to provide 
sensitivity training within sixty days, and when sensitivity training was conducted, 
providing training on sexual harassment rather than racial discrimination.  As the District 
Court noted, there is no provision in the settlement agreement requiring the City to 
permanently terminate O’Brien’s employment.  Thus, the City’s decision to reinstate 
O’Brien did not violate the agreement.  Moreover, even if the City did materially breach 
the agreement by providing sensitivity training one and one-half years later, Appellants 
have failed to demonstrate that they suffered any harm, financial or otherwise, as a result 
of the alleged breach.  See Murphy v. Implicito, 920 A.2d 678, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
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Div. 2007) (explaining that a plaintiff alleging breach of contract must prove that the 
breach proximately caused harm). 
VI. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.
4
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 O’Brien requests that we award damages pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 38.  However, he has failed to file the appropriate motion, and we decline to 
consider his request. 
